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PROPOSED EARNOUT AGREEMENT PROVISIONS
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Associate
Proposed Earnout Agreement Provisions
I.

INTRODUCTION

Attached are proposed terms and provisions to be inserted into
the current draft of our Earnout Agreement (the “Earnout”) between
our client, McClelland & Sons, LLC (“McClelland”) and Private Prisons,
Inc. Executed simultaneously with the Asset Purchase Agreement at
closing, the Earnout will allow our client to realize a more accurate
purchase price based upon the client’s valuations, provided that it can
come to an agreement with state leaders and finalize an additional longterm government contract.
In the Rider attached to this memorandum, I have drafted the
terms of the payment to be made post-closing in the earnout period. I
have also contemplated necessary limitations on the rights under this
agreement, post-closing covenants, and dispute resolution provisions
based on drafting norms in similar transactions. The remainder of this
memorandum sets forth the pertinent facts and the driving factors for
each party to the transaction, addresses the legal issues we face in making
drafting decisions, and expresses my rationale for the proposed solutions
represented in the attached Rider A.
II.

TRANSACTIONAL CONTEXT

Our law firm was recently retained to advise McClelland and
their representatives on the sale of their family business. McClelland is a
B.A., The University of Mississippi; J.D., The University of Tennessee College of Law.
Ms. Clippard is an associate in the Corporate practice group at Butler Snow LLP in
Nashville, Tennessee. The author would like to thank Professor Joan MacLeod
Heminway for her comments and continued support throughout the writing and
editing process of this work.
*
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closely held limited liability company organized under Tennessee law. It
owns and operates a number of large private prison facilities across
Tennessee, its largest customers being the State of Tennessee and the
State of Kentucky. It is my understanding that McClelland is run
primarily by the children and grandchildren of the founding family
members. The third generation of the family business is no longer
interested in managing the business in the long term, and their working
relationships are not as amicable as those of the previous two
generations. As the second generation leaders of the company are aging,
they feel that their best option is to sell the company while it is still a
profitable business and allow the family to pursue other ventures with
the proceeds.
The McClellands have received many offers to purchase their
business over the years, but only from one company, Private Prisons,
Inc. (“PPI”). PPI is a large corporation incorporated in Delaware that
owns private prison facilities in 12 states (largely in the Northeast and
Midwest). It has been interested in acquiring McClelland’s facilities as a
way to enter into the southeastern market. This acquisition will give PPI
its first facility in this area, and together with McClelland’s existing
government contracts and goodwill, will bring further value to PPI’s
expansion into the Southeast. Thus, the parties have entered into a nondisclosure agreement with our client to facilitate further discussions on
the potential acquisition.
In negotiations, McClelland and PPI have not been able to agree
on a valuation of McClelland. PPI valued McClelland at $20 million
without taking into consideration the potential cost of adding new states
as clients and the reasonable projected cost of expansion on the current
property. McClelland believes it is worth $30-35 million with the high
likelihood that negotiations with the State of South Carolina will close
within the year. Recently, other surrounding states have made inquiries
into using McClelland as a contractor. McClelland contends that its
spotless reputation in the Southeast and potential to win additional
government contracts from surrounding states is worth a great deal in
addition to its extensive physical assets. PPI’s position is that McClelland
has had plenty of opportunities to seize additional state contracts, but
has failed to do so because of limited space and aversion to expanding.
Its valuation gives little weight to goodwill and potential new clients; it
also takes into account necessary renovation and expansion costs. Thus,
the gap between the parties’ valuations is significant and unlikely to be
closed in negotiations without the drafting of an Earnout.
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Before sale of the business was broached, McClelland’s leaders
began negotiations with the State of South Carolina to accept hundreds
of new inmates from overcrowded South Carolina prisons. If the
agreement is completed, McClelland could see a drastic increase in
revenue over the next ten years with multiple options to renew. PPI is
not willing to take this transaction into consideration in its valuation
because this opportunity has previously come up for McClelland and
fallen through before a final agreement could be reached. PPI has
agreed, however, to negotiate an Earnout Agreement in conjunction with
the Asset Purchase Agreement, so as to value the company with the
contract only if the government contract comes to fruition within the
agreed upon term of the Earnout Agreement.
McClelland has only one class of common stock held by 10
family members spanning three generations. It has no major outstanding
debt other than short-term liabilities incurred in the ordinary day-to-day
operations of the prison facility. It is duly organized as a membermanaged LLC under the predecessor Tennessee Limited Liability
Company Act and has not opted into the new Tennessee Limited
Liability Company Act. 1 Under T.C.A. § 48-244-201(b), a membermanaged LLC, after notice has been given to all members, voting and
nonvoting, may sell all or substantially all of its assets not in the regular
course of business upon a majority vote in favor of the sale by the
members present at a duly called and held meeting. 2 The McClelland
family recently called a special meeting of all members in order to vote
on the proposed sale of the business. All 10 members attended and
voted unanimously for the sale of the business and agreed upon the
earnout mechanism as the best way to handle a disagreement over
valuation. We have advised the company that under McClelland’s
operational documents a sale of substantially all of the firm’s assets is an
event of dissolution. McClelland’s Charter states that in the event of
such a sale, the company is to file a notice of dissolution within a
reasonable period of time after closing and distribute assets to the
members. We will be advising the firm through this process as well. A
notice of dissolution will be filed with the Secretary of State as soon as
T.C.A. §§ 48-203-101 and 102 require that a person or persons file with the Secretary
of State articles of the LLC for the purpose of any lawful business. TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 48-203-101, -102 (West 2014).
1

2

See TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-244-201(b) (West 2014).
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practicably possible after closing, and McClelland will be wound up and
assets distributed to the members according to procedures set out in
T.C.A. § 48-245-1101.3
PPI is a publicly traded corporation with only one class of
authorized common stock and one class of authorized preferred stock
held by key insiders. PPI’s officers have assured us that PPI is duly
organized under the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware4
and that it has the specific power to purchase assets in the ordinary
course of business without shareholder approval.5 PPI has additionally
agreed to concede the choice of law provision in favor of our clients. In
both the Asset Purchase Agreement and the Earnout, Tennessee law will
govern all disputes and contract interpretation, and the choice of venue
for dispute resolution will be Nashville, Tennessee.6
III.

KEY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

The most important assurance that we need to give to our client
in this transaction is that it will be able to continue negotiations with
South Carolina in the same manner it was able to conduct those
negotiations before the acquisition, so that it may receive some or all of
the earnout payment. If PPI were to thwart McClelland’s efforts or
drastically change the operations of the business so as to turn the
3

See TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-244-1101 (West 2014).

Delaware General Corporate Law (“DGCL”) §101 requires that a person or entity
incorporate to conduct any lawful business or purposes by “filing with the Division of
Corporations in the Department of State a certificate of incorporation which shall be
executed, acknowledged and filed in accordance with § 103 of this title.” DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (West 2014).
4

DGCL § 122(4) states that “[e]very corporation created under this chapter shall have
the power to: [p]urchase, receive, take by grant, gift, devise, bequest or otherwise, lease,
or otherwise acquire, own, hold, improve, employ, use and otherwise deal in and with
real or personal property, or any interest therein, wherever situated, and to sell, convey,
lease, exchange, transfer or otherwise dispose of, or mortgage or pledge, all or any of its
property and assets, or any interest therein, wherever situated.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8,
§ 122 (West 2014).
5

We anticipate that the parties will agree on an alternative dispute resolution provision
to be contained in the Asset Purchase Agreement. Venue for such negotiations,
mediations, and arbitrations will be in Nashville, Tennessee, at the principal offices of
McClelland. In the event that a dispute cannot be resolved outside of litigation,
proceedings will be held in the appropriate court of Davidson County, Nashville,
Tennessee.
6
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prospective client away, McClelland could lose its opportunity to obtain
the additional contingent portion of the purchase price provided for in
the Earnout Agreement. PPI could do this innocently in an attempt to
maximize profits while integrating McClelland’s business into its current
operations, or it could purposefully attempt to poison the contract
negotiations in order to avoid making the earnout payment.7 Thus, it is in
our client’s best interest to include provisions allowing key employees to
remain integrated in the operations of the business uninterrupted and
compelling the cooperation of the leaders at PPI throughout the term of
the earnout period. In order to give our client this assurance, I have
included in Rider A terms for post-closing operation of McClelland’s
business and the cooperation of the acquiring company. The provision
incorporates language promising commercially reasonable efforts to aid
key employees and prohibiting any bad faith efforts to render
McClelland an unattractive provider of services.
Another important consideration is dispute resolution. Detailed
alternative dispute resolution terms are common in earnout agreements
that are based on a determination of financial benchmarks. 8 Where an
earnout employs financial benchmarks, such as operating margin or
revenue, for example, parties often dispute the manner in which such
financials were calculated. To avoid such disputes, it is important for
these parties to agree to detailed dispute resolution procedures, which
often include neutral third parties to audit the acquired firm’s financials.
Payment under our proposed Earnout provisions hinge on the
occurrence of a non-financial benchmark. McClelland will be aiming to
execute an agreement with a new client based on certain minimum
contract numbers. Thus, while this Earnout may be less susceptible to
disputes, it is likely that either party will have objections as to the
performance of the other under this agreement. Our client has made
Taking into consideration that a court may imply good faith and fair dealing
provisions even if they are not explicitly addressed in the agreement. See Horizon
Holdings, LLC v. Genmar Holdings, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1257-58 (D. Kan.
2003) (holding that the earnout payment was part of the purchase price and it was
implied that the target company would be allowed the fair opportunity to operate the
company in a way to maximize their earnout potential).
7

ABA PUBL’G, The 18th Annual National Institute on Negotiating Business Acquisitions, Section
J: Purchase Price Adjustments, Earnouts and Other Purchase Price Provisions, in NEGOTIATING
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 2013, F-37 to F-45 (2013), available at
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/3831754280.
8
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clear that it does not want to end up in litigation with PPI over the
contingent portion of the purchase price given PPI’s size and strength.
For this reason, I have included in Rider A a good faith negotiations
requirement and, if that is not successful, binding arbitration with costs
to be split equally between the parties. Binding arbitration with costs
split equally is a recognized norm in earnout agreements in relation to
the sale of a business.9
Finally, the right to future payment contingent upon the
satisfaction of a few conditions has attributes similar to those of a
security, and neither party to this transaction would like to register the
offer or sale of this right to payment with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”). The SEC has issued a series of noaction letters on this issue that identify elements distinguishing a right
under an earnout agreement from a security regulated under federal and
state securities law.10 I have included a “No Assignment” provision in
the Earnout to help ensure that the rights under the Earnout Agreement
do not fall within the realm of securities regulation.
IV. ANALYSIS OF MAJOR DRAFTING DECISIONS

To begin Rider A, I have drafted the most important provision
of the Earnout, the earnout payment. The lump cash sum to become
payable upon the effectiveness of the contract between McClelland and
the State of South Carolina is $5,000,000. 11 This amount reflects the
agreed-upon increase in value due to the revenue stream the contract will
supply, as well as the enhanced prospect of attracting additional
government clients. The difference between PPI and McClelland’s
valuations was more than $5,000,000; however, our client was willing to
keep this number lower in order to gain cooperation in all other terms of
Id. at F-56. (Arbitration is the norm. Parties often split the costs associated with
arbitration, but they also may let the losing party bear all costs).
9

See Great Western Financial Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 28156 (Apr. 14,
1983); Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL
30832 (Mar. 3, 1983); Lifemark Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 WL 25420 (Nov.
17, 1981); and Kaiser Aetna, SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 9661 (July 30, 1973).
10

I chose an all-cash payment over a stock payment or a combined stock and cash
payment because it makes the right to payment more clearly fall outside the definition
of a security (to be discussed further below). Our client’s shareholders have also
expressed the desire to deal exclusively in cash consideration due to their anticipated
dissolution after closing and their desire to seize new investment opportunities.
11
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the Earnout,i.e., choice of law, dispute resolution, post-closing
cooperation, and term. This language was modeled after a precedent
document in a similar transaction employing a similar non-financial
payment trigger.12 The contract to be executed with the State of South
Carolina must meet certain minimums in order to trigger PPI’s
obligation to make the earnout payment. McClelland and the State of
South Carolina must agree to a “long-term” contract to exceed [ ] years,
and the contract must provide for at least $[ ] amount in income per
year.13 As long as the contract reaches these two parameters, PPI will be
obligated to pay the additional portion of the purchase price under the
Earnout.
The three remaining provisions represent our client’s biggest
concerns in entering into this agreement. The next few paragraphs of
this memorandum address the principal decisions made in drafting those
sections in the order in which the relevant text appears in the Rider.
First, because the trigger for the earnout payment is the
effectuation of a contract between McClelland and the State of South
Carolina, our client needs to be assured that it will be able to continue
working in the ordinary course of business toward the definitive
agreement between McClelland and the State of South Carolina. This
will require support from and the cooperation of PPI. Accordingly, the
post-closing cooperation provision is designed to cover three things: (1)
McClelland’s key employees’ primary control and involvement in
continued negotiations, (2) PPI’s obligation to act in good faith, and (3)
PPI’s commitment to exerting commercially reasonable efforts to aid
McClelland’s employees in reaching a Definitive Agreement, as defined
in Rider A. The phrase “commercially reasonable efforts” has long been
a subject of litigation in mergers and acquisitions. In general,
“commercially reasonable efforts” is a less onerous standard than those
clauses that utilize “best efforts.” 14 I chose to include this standard so
that PPI would feel that it is able to operate its newly integrated business
Language initially modeled after Section 4.1.2, which details the portion of the
purchase price contingent on non-financial milestones. UniTek Global Servs., Inc.,
Asset Purchase Agreement, (Ex. 2.1, Form 8-K) (Sept. 12, 2012).
12

The minimum term and price of contract between PPI and the State of South
Carolina is to be determined by the parties at the final stage of negotiation.
13

14

Earn-outs, PRAC. LAW CORP. & SEC., Practice Note 0-500-1650. (Aug. 2014).
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in the way it best sees fit, so long as that process does not substantially
interfere with the goal McClelland’s employees have of selling that
process to a large government client.
Second, I have drafted an alternative dispute resolution provision
to better ensure that our client does not end up in a lengthy and
expensive litigation situation. Although most earnout agreements include
detailed dispute resolution provisions in order to resolve any financial
and accounting discrepancies by independent parties, we want to ensure
our client will be paid under the Earnout Agreement without
unnecessary objections from PPI about the contents of the Definitive
Agreement. For this reason, I have tailored the language to require a 30day negotiation period, and if that is not successful, binding arbitration.
From my research, binding arbitration is a norm in earnout agreements,15
and it is also the preference of our client. In order to ensure an unbiased
proceeding and prevent any undue influence from PPI, I included
procedure for selecting the three arbitrators, adherence to the standard
AAA rules, and our client’s preferred venue.
Finally, both parties to this transaction are adamant that the
Earnout Agreement in conjunction with the Asset Purchase Agreement
be drafted in a manner to avoid all federal securities regulations. Section
2(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, defines “security” broadly
to include notes, stock, investment contracts, certificates of interest in a
profit-sharing agreement, evidence of indebtedness, security futures,
among other rights to payment.16 Under the Supreme Court’s decision in
Howey, an “investment contract” is “a contract or scheme for ‘the placing
of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or
profit from its employment.”17 Otherwise stated, the term includes any
situation where a person or firm was led to invest money and expect
profits solely from the efforts of others. 18 Because the right to future
payment under earnout agreements could be construed to fit within this
definition, the SEC has issued a series of no-action letters offering a
See NuPathe Inc., Contingent Cash Consideration Agreement (Ex. 99.1, Form8-K)
(Dec. 16, 2013) (labeling Section 22 as “Negotiation; Arbitration.”); Alcoa Inc., Earnout
Agreement (Ex. 10.1, Form 8-K) (June 27, 2014) (labeling Section 7.10 as
“Arbitration”).
15

16

See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b (West 2012).

17

SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).

18

Id.
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limited regulatory safe harbor for this type of transaction and payment
structure. The SEC should not bring action on this limited basis. The
letters may or may not prevent a claim that the earnout is a security;
however, courts tend to give no-action letters the effect of regulations.
The SEC has stated that the following factors demonstrate that a
particular earnout agreement should not be considered a security and
thus will not necessitate registration:
[1] The earnout right was granted to the sellers as part of
the consideration for the sale of their business and neither
the buyers nor the sellers viewed the right as involving an
“investment” by the sellers; [2] The earnout right did not
represent an ownership interest in the buyer and was not
evidenced by any certificates; [3] The earnout right could
not be transferred except by operation of law; [4] The
earnout right did not entitle the owner to voting or
dividend rights.19
The Asset Purchase Agreement will specifically reference that the
earnout payment is a portion of the consideration for the purchased
assets and that the acquisition will result in the winding up of the
McClelland business. Thus, the right to the earnout payment cannot be
construed as an investment in an ongoing business, as it will cease to
exist. The earnout is a right to a lump-sum cash payment. No portion of
the consideration paid to McClelland will consist of PPI stock. Thus,
McClelland will not acquire any ownership interest, voting, or dividend
rights in PPI as a result of this transaction. Finally, the right to the
earnout payment cannot be transferred except by operation of law. To
restrict transfer of McClelland’s right to the earnout payment, I have
included in Rider A a specific “No Assignment” provision prohibiting
McClelland from transferring its interests under the Earnout Agreement
unless done by operation of law or as a transfer of their membership

ABA PUBL’G, supra note 8, at F-58 (citing to the following SEC no-action letters:
Great Western Financial Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 28156 (Apr. 14,
1983); Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL
30832 (Mar. 3, 1983); Lifemark Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 WL 25420 (Nov.
17, 1981); and Kaiser Aetna, SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 9661 (July 30, 1973)).
19
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interest in the winding up of McClelland.20 This drafting should allow the
parties to avoid the application of federal securities regulation, including
the need to register the offer and sale of the earnout right.
V. MINOR DRAFTING DECISIONS

Below are some of the less significant drafting choices I made in
drafting the provisions included in the Rider:
 By defining in section one the minimum parameters of the contract
with the State of South Carolina, I attempted to manage PPI’s
expectations for the contract, so that the payment cannot be delayed
by an objection to the ultimate quality of the agreement.
 In section two, I gave McClelland sole discretion in proceeding in
negotiations with the State of South Carolina. I believe this is the
most clear-cut way to set out who will be responsible for executing
the definitive agreement. In opting not to use the term “cooperation,”
I hope to give McClelland more control post-closing over the
earnout’s success or failure. PPI’s directors and officers will have
reasonable access to information on the progress of negotiations and
will be allowed to exercise oversight to the extent that is required by
law or corporate governance rules elected in the organizational
documents.
 In section two, I chose to use the phrase “unduly burden” to qualify
the exercise of discretion by McClelland in negotiating the final terms
of the contract with the State of South Carolina. I think it is unlikely
PPI would agree to the “sole discretion” standard if it were not
modified by this covenant. Taken together, the sole discretion
standard and the undue burden limitation give each party what it
desires: control in its own area of expertise.

I have contemplated that our client’s members may wish to transfer all or a portion
of their membership interest to another family member before a large distribution for
preferable tax treatment.
20
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RIDER A
EARNOUT AGREEMENT BETWEEN
MCCLELLAND & SONS, LLC AND PRIVATE PRISONS, INC.

1. Earnout Payment. PPI shall pay to McClelland as additional
consideration for the Purchased Assets under the Purchase
Agreement a total of $5,000,000 in cash (the “Earnout Payment”),
which amount shall become payable upon the occurrence of the
following conditions: (i) PPI in conjunction with McClelland’s
representatives come to a final agreement in writing with the State of
South Carolina (the “State”) for the use of the Acquired Business’s
services (the “Definitive Agreement”); (ii) the Definitive
Agreement shall have an initial term of not less than ten years
including any renewal periods; and (iii) the Definitive Agreement
shall generate at least $1,000,000 in income per year during its initial
term. For the purposes of this section, “income” shall mean all
consideration paid by the State to PPI for the services rendered by
the Acquired Business and shall not take into account any
deductions, expenses, set offs, or costs.
2. Post-Closing Covenants. Subject to the terms of this Agreement
and the Purchase Agreement, subsequent to the Closing,
McClelland’s representatives shall have primary control with regards
to matters relating to the negotiation of the Definitive Agreement as
long as McClelland’s discretion does not unduly burden PPI in
operating the Acquired Business in a commercially reasonable
manner. PPI shall not, directly or indirectly, take any actions in bad
faith that would have the purpose of avoiding the Earnout Payment
provided for in this Agreement. And further, PPI shall use, and shall
cause its respective officers, managers and employees to use,
commercially reasonable efforts to aid McClelland’s representatives
in finalizing the Definitive Agreement.21
3. Negotiation, Arbitration. (a) Prior to any arbitration, all parties to
this agreement shall agree to negotiate in good faith for a period of
30 days to resolve any controversy or claim arising out of or relating

See Alcoa Inc., Earnout Agreement (Ex. 10.1, Form 8-K) (June 27, 2014) (modeling
last sentence after language found in Section 2.4).
21

194 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17

to this Agreement, including the alleged breach of this Agreement.22
(b) After the expiration of the 30-day period, any controversy or
claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, including any
alleged breach of this Agreement, shall be settled by binding
arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association
under its Commercial Arbitration Rules. The number of arbitrators
shall be three. PPI and McClelland shall each select one person
experienced in mergers and acquisitions to act as arbitrator. The two
selected arbitrators shall select a third similarly experienced person to
act as arbitrator. The location of the arbitration shall be Nashville,
Tennessee. The written opinion of the arbitrators shall be delivered
within 180 days of the commencement of arbitration. All fees and
expenses incurred in relation to any arbitration, including the costs
and expenses billed by the arbitrators, shall be paid by both parties in
equal parts.23
4. No Assignment. The right to payment under this Agreement shall
not be sold, assigned, transferred, pledged, encumbered, or in any
other manner transferred or disposed of, in whole or in part, other
than through a Permitted Transfer. A Permitted Transfer includes
(a) a transfer of any or all of the membership interests and right to
distributions by McClelland in the winding up of the business upon
death, by will or intestacy, by gift or other estate planning purposes;
(b) a transfer made under the order of a court with competent
jurisdiction (such as in connection with divorce, bankruptcy or
liquidation); or (c) a transfer made by operation of law.24

See NuPathe Inc., Contingent Cash Consideration Agreement (Ex. 99.1, Form 8-K)
(Dec.16, 2013) (modeling language after Section 22(a)).
22

23
24

Id. at § 22(b).
Id. at § 5.

